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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHESTER E. FARROW, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
VS 
HEALTH SERVICES CORPORATION, 
a corporation, SALT LAKE CLINIC, 
a professional corporation, 
LOUIS J. SCHRICKER, M.D. and 
LOUIS J. MOENCH, M.D. 
Defendants and Respondents.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is a malpractice action brought by 
Appellant, Chester E. Farrow, against Health Services 
Corporation (owner and operator of t~e LOS Hospital, 
Salt Lake City, Utah); Salt Lake Clinic, Louis J. 
Schricker, M.D. and Louis J. Moench, M.D. 
Chester E. Farrow entered the LDS Hospital 
as a patient of Dr. Louis J. Schricker on the 12th day 
of August, 1974. His initial diagnosis was that of 
cervical spondylosis. He was operated on for this con-
dition on August 15, 1974. The operation was, evidently, 
a success. However, on returning from the recovery 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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room and later while a patient on the neurosurgical 
floor of the hospital he became confused and disorientE 
and suffered from hallucinations at times. When the 
condition persisted, appellant requested pnyciatric 
help from Dr. Schricker. Dr. Schricker arranged for 
a consultation by Dr. Louis J. Moench. Dr. Moench saw 
appellant on the evening of August 23, 1974. Subsequen 
to that visit and during the early morning hours of Aug 
24, 1974, appellant broke the window of his room on the 
sixth floor of the hospital; jumped through the window 
and landed on a roof above the first floor entrance of 
the hospital on the west side. As a result of the fall 
and injuries sustained by appellant, he was rendered 
permanently paralized and is now quadriplegic. 
Appellant claims that the hospital and attend 
physicians were negligent in his care, treatment and ca 
trol post-operatively; and that his accident would not 
have happened had appropriate measures of surveilance m 
control been taken by those responsible. 
Respondents deny any negligence on their part 
and allege further that appellant's fall and injuries 
w~re caused by a suicide attempt . 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted sununary judgment 
in favor of Dr. Schricker and Health Services Corpora-
tion. The issues against Dr. Moench were tried to a 
jury. From a verdict and judgment for Dr. Moench and 
from the sununary judgments, plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgments 
in favor of defendants and asks for trial on the merits 
against all defendants . 
• 2a. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Chester E. Farrow, the plaintiff, was born 
December 28, 1924 and resided in Moab, Utah at the time 
of this accident. He received his education in geology 
from Okalahoma State University and was working as a 
consulting geologist in mineral exploration at the time 
of the accident. His training included work for the 
U.S.G.S., Bureau of Reclamation, Atomic Energy Commission, 
and Tidewater Oil Company. He has worked as a consulting 
geologist all over the western United States, Australia, 
South America, Central America, Canada and West Africa. 
Tr. 110-112. 
His services were in demand and he earned a 
substantial income. Tr. 184. 
In August, 1974, Farrow suffered an accident 
involving his 4-wheel drive vehicle. He was taking a 
sack of flour from the vehicle to his home when he struck 
his left arm against a mirror bracket on the car. This 
caused a series of spasms in his arm, through his shoulder 
and into his neck. This was on a Saturday in August, 
1974. Tr. 115-116. He called the local doctor in Moab 
and received a prescription but the pain continued and 
on Monday he consulted his family doctor. Tr. 117. 
About Wednesday the following week he was hospitalized 
.3. 
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in Moab, Utah for x-rays. It was suggested by his lac 
doctor that he would require additional treatment and 
would have to go to Salt Lake City for that purpose. 
About August 11, 1974, he came to Salt Lake City, staye 
overnight in a motel and was admitted to the LOS Hospit 
by Dr. Louis J. Schricker on August 12, 1974. (Tr. lH 
Prior to any operative procedures being per-
formed upon plaintiff he stated both to Dr. Schricker 
and the anesthesiologist that he had had a violent re-
action to an anesthetic that was given to him in 1949 
for an appendectomy. He advised them that as he was 
coming out of the anesthetic he became violent and it 
took several people to hold him down. (Tr. 119) 
The first procedure performed upon him after 
he entered the hospital was a myelogram which confirmed 
the diagnosis of herniated disc at the C5-C6 level. 
(Page 36 of Hospital Records, Exhibit "Dl") 
On August 15, 1974, Dr. Schricker performed 
a laminectomy and discectomy on the cervical spine at 
the level indicated. 
For a day or two following the operation, pla 
tiff had no knowledge of events that occurred to him or 
his surroundings. He did have a recollection, however, 
of a mental impression of bizarre events and happenings 
that occurred during this period of time that he typif~ 
• 4. 
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as being hallucinations. He saw bright lights and people 
running as if an atomic blast had occurred. He experienced 
fear for the safety of his wife and daughter. He ex-
perienced sexual fantasies and had a mental picture of 
his home and office being burned down. (Tr. 124) After 
he became rational, he told Dr. Schricker about these 
episodes. (Tr. 125) 
During the course of his post-operative progress, 
he first had visual hallucinations and later the halluci-
nations became auditory in nature. At times he was lucid 
and completely in control of his faculties and emotions. 
Then without apparent cause he would begin to hallucinate. 
He had no control of these matters, hallucinations would 
simply come and go. (Tr. 125-126) 
As time progressed, the hallucinations were 
auditory rather than visual and consisted of voices in 
the room (he was in a private room at all times). The 
voices were accusatory and derogatory to him and he be-
came very fearful about his own future. He did not have 
insight into what was happening to him. (Tr. 127) _ 
On two occasions during lucid moments he asked 
Dr. Schricker to change his room. On one occasion he 
asked Mr. Kent Griffiths (a social worker employed by 
the hospital) to change his room. He was never moved. 
(Tr. 127) 
• 5. 
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The hallucinations continued. At times the 
sensation was very brief; at other times it would last 
most of the night. He had a mental impression that he 
was in a psychiatric observation ward and that the voic 
were talking about him. He detected that he was able t 
identify one of the voices, that of Dr. Schricker, the 
other voices were that of an older man and woman and a 
person with a Southern accent but he was unable to iden 
those voices. (Tr. 128-129) 
He felt that during his hospital stay the 
hallucinations began to be less in frequency but a shor 
time before he jumped from the hospital room, the hallu 
cinations had definitely increased in intensity. (Tr. 
Mr. Kent Griffiths has been mentioned before. 
He was assigned to visit with Mr. Farrow because of cer 
tain concerns expressed by plaintiff's wife over the fa 
that a gun that Mr. Farrow had at home had been misplac 
and she thought he had taken it with him to the hospita 
The fact is he did not have a gun. During his hospital 
stay Mr. Griffith became a confidant and the only persu 
in the hospital that plaintiff felt at ease with. (Tr. 
The afternoon before the night this terrible tragedy 
occurred, Mr. Griffiths had taken plaintiff to the ou~ 
patio of the hospital and it was one of the only times 
during his hospital stay that plaintiff had felt any ~ 
(Tr. 139) 
. 6. 
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By August 23, plaintiff realized that he needed 
help. He asked Dr. Schricker to get him the best psychi-
trist in the City becacse he wanted someone to straighten 
him out and provide the proper care. {Tr. 1369) 
To add to the confusion and fear that had oc-
curred to this man, the hospital had lost or misplaced 
his money. Plaintiff customarily carried a fairly large 
amount of cash for use in his business of acquiring 
mineral options. When he entered the hospital he had 
between three and four thousand dollars cash on his person 
which he turned into the hospital on admittance. He be-
came aware, after the operation, that the hospital could 
not produce his money and this fact greatly disturbed him. 
(Tr. 1369 - 1370) The money was eventually found, but 
not until after he had jumped from the window. 
Returning to the events of this day, plaintiff 
returned to his room after his visit with Mr. Griffith 
on the hospital patio. On his return the hallucinations 
again commenced. He had a great deal of anxiety and called 
his wife at least twice before he was visited by the 
psychitrist, Mr. Moench. (Tr. 1374) 
He was fearful and suspicious of everyone in 
the hospital. He did not contact the nurses about his 
condition because he felt they were spies for the voices 
that were accusing him and making derogatory _remarks about 
• 7. 
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him. He had the mental impression that the people we~ 
going to put him in a mental institution. 
Dr. Moench vjsited with him in his hospital 
room on the evening of the 23rd. (Tr. 1376) 
The visit by Dr. Moench was a question and 
answer period wherein the plaintiff discussed the fact 
that he was having marital problems and that he was 
greatly concerned about the hallucinations that he was 
experiencing. Plaintiff has no recollection that Dr. 
Moench gave him any diagnosis of his problem or that h 
said anything about what plaintiff could expect in the 
future. He did try to reassure plaintiff. Dr. Moench 
frightened him by the manner of his questions and pla~ 
tiff became very anxious after Dr. Moench left. He cal 
his wife and expressed that anxiety to her. (Tr. 13791 
At the time Dr. Moench left, plaintiff had e 
mental impression that Dr. Moench was talking to someo1 
in the hall and that he had stated that they would ha~ 
to transfer plaintiff to a mental institution. (Tr. 13 
Whether this was a hallucination or fact plaintiff cou 
not tell. At the time it occurred, he believed it was 
true and this created more fear and anxiety. 
Some time after eight o'clock as indicated h 
called his wife. He told her to be sure to call him t 
next morning by nine-thirty because he felt that some-
. 8. 
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thing was going to happen to him, that he might be moved 
and that he was very much afraid. (Tr. 1380) 
The events occurring subsequent to Dr. Moench's 
visit can best be described by reference to the actual 
testimony of the plaintiff. 
Q Then I want you to discuss with us and tell 
us in detal everything that happened to you from that 
point up until the time that you went out the window. 
A Well, these audio hallucinations continued 
in intensity and frequency. I was very much afraid. I 
would get into bed; I would lie there a few minutes; I 
would get up, walk back and forth around the room, lie 
back in bed again trying to rest. I was very anxious. 
I'd get up and pace again. 
There was a large chair in the corner of the 
room. I would sit in this for awhile. I thought that 
these people--I heard noises outside the room. The door 
was closed. I didn't know what was going on. I thought 
that these people were coming to get me, and I didn't 
have anything to defend myself with. I felt that I 
couldn't get out that door and get by them. There was 
a bathroom which--
Q At that point--
A Yes? 
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Q Had you reached a mental determination of 
action on your part? 
A All I wanted to do at that point and ever 
since I had talked with Dr. Moench was to get out of tl 
room. And I attempted to go through the bathroom, whii 
the other room adjoining me had a door which opened o~ 
and I went from my side of the bathroom into the other 
man's room. I heard people talking, heard somebody 
cough, and I--it scared me--and I came back in through 
the bathroom into the room which I was in. I made no 
further attempt to try to get out through the doorway. 
I didn't know what to do. I kept going back and forth 
to bed, getting up and walking around, sitting in the 
chair, very much afraid, trying to fig~re out what I 
could do. 
These hallucinations were increasing. I had 
reached a point where I was not sure what I was doing. 
Q Did you know where you were? 
A Not all the time, I didn't. Part of the 
time I thought that I was back in the hospital in Moab. 
Q How many stories does that hospital have? 
A It's only one floor. 
Q Continue. 
A Anyway, this kept going on and on. And I 
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don't recall anyone coming into the room after Dr. Moench 
left. If they did, I have no recollection of it whatso-
ever. 
Eventually, the whole thing just got the best 
of me. I took the chair and I broke out the left window 
of the room which I was in--it was a plate glass window--
I broke it clean so that--
Q Where did you think you were then? 
A I thought that I was on the ground floor 
and that I could just jump out of the window and run. 
And that's what I did. I took and broke the window 
clean so that I would not cut myself. There were no 
jagged edges, as I remember, and the only cut that I 
received from the glass was a small scar right there. 
That's the only place. 
Q Pointing to your left hand? 
A No, it's the right hand. 
Q Excuse me, the right hand? 
A It's right there. And that's the only cut 
that I received from the glass. 
I stepped back from the window after I had 
broken it out, and I saw a place--and I would guess less 
than about 15 seconds, I stepped back from the window 
I would say about two paces, and I ran and jumped as if 
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were to be hurdling the windowsill. And it's possi~ 
to do that. I actually put my foot on the windowsill 
when I went down. And as soon as I went out the win& 
I knew that--what had happened. 
Q As soon as you left the room, is that corn 
A That's correct. 
Q What did you think right at that moment? 
A I just said, "Oh, my God." 
MR. SNOW: Object to that as self-serving. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
A I said, "Oh, my God." And I was falling 
face down. And then I rolled over on my back, and I 
landed on my left shoulder and my head on the top of t 
covering of the--it's a walkway, I guess, to the entn 
of the hospital. (Tr. 1381, line 13 - 1383, line 28) 
Exhibit 3P is a photograph of the west side 
of the LDS Hospital. At the time of the accident, Ffil 
was in a sixth-floor private room. He jumped from the 
window marked with a circle and landed on a roof cover 
the first floor entrance to the hospital. The posit~ 
of his body is marked with a circle and his name is 
written to the side. He did not lose consciousness as 
a result of the fall. He tried to move both his arms 
legs but realized immediately that he was paralyzed. 
l?. 
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was in extreme pain. Dr. Schricker arrived and climbed 
onto the roof while Farrow lay there. He said "Chester, 
why in the hell did yo~ do it?" Farrow replied that he 
did not know. (Tr. 1385-1386) 
Eventually he was removed from the roof by 
fireman and taken inside the hospital for treatment. He 
remained in the hospital from his admittance in August 
to December 3, 1974. (Exhibit Pl) As a result of the 
fall he sustained a fractured dislocation of cervical 
disc C-5, C-6 and C-7 resulting in severe damage to the 
spinal column, resulting in paralysis. He has had numer-
ous operations and surgical procedures performed upon 
him, both at LOS Hospital and later at the VA Hospital 
in Long Beach, California. He is quadreplegic and his 
paralysis is permanent. 
For a complete understanding of this case, and 
the reasons why this medical tragedy occurred and why it 
could have been prevented, one must carefully analyze 
Farrow's medical record at the LOS Hospital and the testi-
mony of the doctors and nurses and other hospital personnel 
who had contact with the plaintiff. It is the interaction 
or rather the lack of interaction between these people 
that caused this accident. Each of those involved either 
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failed to carry out their duties or did so in a super-
ficial and negligent manner. 
The following factual survey will deal with 
the facts contained in the hospital record and the te~ 
mony of the personnel as these events unfold. 
Examining the hospital records, the Court is 
asked to note that each sheet bears a penciled number 
usually in the lower right-hand corner. The hospital 
practice when a patient is discharged from the hospit~ 
is to send the hospital record to the records librarim 
At that time a clerk numbers each page serially. Thee 
sheets in this record that are not numbered are "physic 
order sheets for August 15, 1974 through August 24, 19: 
involving three separate sheets. These are now locat~ 
between numbered sheets 48 and 49. The unnumbered shee 
were missing from the first copies of hospital records 
obtained by plaintiff's attorneys but were later obtair 
from counsel for the hospital. No explanation has beer 
offered as to why these sheets are unnumbered or why tr 
were not with the other records for some period of time 
The first indication given to the defendants 
in this case that there might be a potential problem ~ 
when plaintiff entered the hospital and advised Dr. 
Schricker and the anesthesiologist of the bad reaction 
he had had years earlier from anesthetic given during 
.14. 
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an appendectomy. This is noted on page 85 of the Record 
made by Dr. Lee Learned the anestheologist. The conver-
sation was vaguely recalled by Dr. Schricker. (Tr. 1314) 
Clearly the doctors were put on notice of a potential 
problem. 
After the operation a problem did develop. 
Plaintiff became confused, disoriented and depressed. 
This is reflected in the hospital records and particularly 
those notations made in the progress notes and the bed-
side clinical sheets signed by the nurses. We take this 
from the 16th of August, 1974 which was the day Farrow 
was taken from the intensive care unit to a private room 
on the neurosurgical floor. 
AUGUST 16, 1974 
PROGRESS NOTE 
Transfer oul of ICU when 
bed is available. Doing 
well. Maybe sl. confusion 
(signed) Schricker. 
NURSES NOTE - BEDSIDE 
CLINICAL 
8:30 p.m. Resting quietly 
10:30 Resting quietly. 
AUGUST 17, 1974 
PROGRESS NOTE 
Some confusion this evening. 
Neck is "good". Some ful-
ness but not unexpected. 
Good spirits. (signed) 
Schricker. 
.15. 
BEDSIDE CLINICAL 
12:00 a.m. Alert and 
oriented. Further note, has 
difficulty turning c/o dis-
comfort in arms when on side. 
States wife and six-year old 
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August 17, 1974 
Continued 
BEDSIDE CLINICAL (Cont; 
daughter were here at ( 
Refused breakfast at t 
stated he was going to 
(operating room) alert 
oriented. 
AUGUST 18, 1974 
PROGRESS NOTE 
Quite confused during the 
night and is not oriented 
fully. Wife told nurse 
during the night that this 
is not unusual for him that 
it had been going on for 
several months. Calmed 
down a bit at present. 
(signed) Schricker. 
BEDSIDE CLINICAL 
4: 0 0 a. m. Resting quiE 
in bed. 
7:00 to 3:00 Eating1 
agitated at times, re~ 
quietly at other times. 
4:00 p.m. Walked inh 
and complains of left ' 
being numb and tingly, 
pain in shoulders, gr~ 
Confused at times. 
AUGUST 19, 1974 
PROGRESS NO'I:::: 
Still remains moderately con-
fused but less combative. 
Left arm feels good except 
for some numbness in left 
index finger. (signed) 
Schricker 
.16. 
BEDSIDE CLINICAL 
12:00 a.m. Appears to 
asleep. 
4:00 to 6:00 Asleep 
most of Noc. 
7:40 Alert, awake 
8: 30 c/o pain TL noti 
10:00 Resting 
11:30 Resting TL notif 
patients request for W 
relaxant 
1: 00 Resting, having 
pain, talking on phone 
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August 19, 1974 
Continued 
BEDSIDE CLINICAL (Continued) 
4:00 Chilly - asked for 
pain med. 
6:00 Nauseated 
6:45 Up to BR 
8:00 Asked for milk 
9:00 Cooperative 
10:00 Had a carton of milk 
No special problems 
AUGUST 20, 1974 
PROGRESS NOTE 
Much more oriented today and 
wondering what has gone on 
the past few days. Is con-
cerned about his wife. Neck 
is soft and pliable. Good 
progress. (signed) Schricker 
BEDSIDE CLINICAL 
12:00 to 1:00 a.m. Appears 
to be asleep 
2:00 Awake c/o that he 
can't sleep 
4:00 Appears to be asleep 
6:00 A fairly restful night 
frequently stiring. 
8:00 Complaint of losing 
watch. Would like to get 
envelope from downstairs. 
c/o bad headache. Seems 
to be feeling better. Visiting. 
4:00 p.m. Appears depressed. 
AUGUST 21, 1974 
PROGRESS NOTE 
Doing better today. Daughter 
an c wife are here and he is 
very happy today. (signed) 
Schricker 
- 1 7 -
BEDSIDE CLINICAL 
12:00 a.m. Appears to be 
asleep. 
4:00 
7:00 
10:00 
Appears to be asleep. 
Resting 
Family in to visit. 
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August 21, 1974 
Continued 
PROGRESS NOTE (Continued) 
Dr. Schricker! Can we con-
. sider a psych consult on this 
pt? (signed) Kent Griffith 
Yes! (writing of Dr. 
Schricker) 
BEDSIDE CLINICAL (Cont~ 
12:00 p.m. Appears co~ 
table. Sleeping. 
8: 00 Up ad lib. Seem: 
oriented and quiet. No 
plaints. 
AUGUST 22, 1974 
PROGRESS NOTE 
Much clearer! Doing well 
ambulating. (signed) 
Schricker 
BEDSIDE CLINICAL 
12:00 a.m. Asleep at lm 
intervals during noc. 
7:00 - 8:00 
complaints. 
and friend. 
Awake, no 
Awaiting wi 
12:00 p.m. Patient ve~ 
cooperative. 
3:00 A quiet day. 
4:00 Up ad lib. inn 
and in hall. No compl~ 
8:00 Made ready for tl 
night. 
AUGUST 23, 1974 
PROGRESS NOTE 
Has asked for psychiatric 
help today for the first 
time. Neurologically he 
is doing quite well. 
(signed) Schricker 
• 18. 
BEDSIDE CLINICAL 
12:00 a.m. Appears to~ 
asleep. 
4:00 - 6:00 Asleep mo~ 
8: 00 Patient claims tha 
does not feel well . 
-
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August 23, 1974 
Continued 
PROGRESS NOTE (Continued) 
Dr. Moench contacted and 
will see patient this even-
ing. He is clear and well 
oriented, seems happier 
today. (signed) Schricker. 
BEDSIDE CLINICAL (Continued) 
2:00 p.m. Patient feels very 
tired. No pain at the moment. 
Good day. 
4:00 Up ad lib. No com-
plaints 
6:00 Dr. Moench here 
8:00 Resting quietly. 
10:00 Backrub given, made 
ready for the night. 
AUGUST 24, 1974 
• 19. 
BEDSIDE CLINICAL 
12:00 a.m. Spoke to patient 
states he is o.k. Offers 
no complaint. Instructed 
to call nurse if he should 
need anything. 
1:30 Checked patient. 
Seemed asleep. 
2:40 Upon hearing loud crash 
while in 611 I entered 607 
patient was not in bed, I 
turned on light and was that 
window was broken. Upon look-
ing out window was what ap-
peared to be Mr. Farrow lying 
on 2nd floor roof. Nursing 
supervisor (F. Blood) notified 
administrator of nursing and 
nursing administration noti-
fied Dr. Schricker and Moench 
notified . 
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The Progress Note and nurses notes have be~ 
set forth in detail here for several days following th 
operation until the moment he jumped from the window. 
Significantly, we find that the psychiatric social wm 
Mr. Griffith, felt concerned enough about this patient 
put a note in the chart requesting a psychiatric cons~ 
He emphasized his request with exclamation points. ~. 
Schricker responded by placing an exclamation point aft 
the word "yes". Note also, the following day where Dr. 
Schricker places an exclamation point after the words 
"Much clearer!" (There appears to be a little bit of~ 
fessional pride involved here.) 
Dr. Moench saw Farrow on the evening of the; 
at about 6: 00 p. m. He completed his examination and re 
port at 8:00 p.m. The report is on pages 68 and 69 of 
hospital record. It is reproduced here. 
Age 49. 
Patient is a geologist from Moab who 
had a recent injury and operation for 
cerv - disc. Following, he has had marked 
and repid swings in mood, in contact with 
with reality, has fluctuated between 
cooperation and compliance and combative, 
suspicious hostility. 
At present he is very tense, says he 
hears voices of 2 to 4 persons - in hall 
and ceiling, talking about (not to) him, 
.20. 
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keeping him under surveilance, accusing 
him of being a sex fiend, etc. etc. 
Tells of prolonged marital problems, 
of lack of problem-solving skills (bi-
lateral), of periods of tension over fi-
nances, and esp. recently when his work 
pressures are high. Had 2 counselling 
sessions but felt that he was cast as the 
villain, so he didn't continue. Has 
enjoyed and appreciated his visits (with) 
Mr. Griffith. Was esp. appreciative of 
a visit off the ward, where the surveil-
ance doesn't follow. 
Imp = 1. Long term marital maladjust 
2. Present episode is either a 
dissociative reaction or a paranoid schizo-
phrenic reaction. His tension is very 
high; his anxiety level very high; his 
distortion of reality may lead to acts 
of poor judgment. 
Suggest: 1. A phenothiazine med. in 
fairly large doses promptly (I'll take the 
liberty of ordering) . 
2. Avoid barbiturates, if 
possible. 
3. Repeated reassurance by 
direct nurse contact (nurse entering room, 
standing by bed, while talking). 
4. If aud. hallucinations 
don't subside promptly, may have to move 
to 3 North (psychiatric ward) for safety. * 
s. Continue marital counsel-
ing (with) Mr. Griffiths. 
Thanks 
L. G. Moench 
23 Aug 74 
20:00 hours 
* The words "psychiatric ward" added for clarity • 
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The foregoing factual summary protrays this 
medical tragejy. First, from the mental impressions 
plaintiff and then from the record as set forth by th 
attending psysician, the psychiatrist and the nurses, 
From this impression, it is apparent that Mr. Farrow. 
a very sick and very disturbed person. 
As the points of argument unfold the testh 
of other witnesses in the case will be discussed ind 
tail as it pertains directly to the elements of liabi 
POINT I: THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMEN 
TO DEFENDANT LOUIS J. SCHRICKER, M.D. AND 
HEALTH SERVICES CORPORATION (LDS HOSPITAL) 
On August 29, 1977, the day before this tri 
was to begin, motions for summary judgment were arguei 
by Health Services Corporation and Louis J. Schricker 
Cross-motions by plaintiff against the defendants wer 
filed and argued by the plaintiff. To the astonis~! 
of practically everyone involved in this case, the ~ 
granted summary judgment to Louis J. Schricker, MD an1 
Health Services Corporation. 
The evidence before the court at the time 
simply did not warrant summary judgment. Considered< 
it must be, in a light most favorable to the losing P 
(plaintiff) , the evidence clearly shows a genuine is8 
. 22. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of fact for determination by the jury. 
The lower court either chose to ignore or 
completely failed to understand the testimony of the 
witnesses. 
The court had before it at the time of the 
motion the deposition of Dr. Sydney Walker, a psychi-
atrist practicing in La Jolla, California. The deposi-
tion was taken by the attorneys representing the de-
fendants. The testimony of Dr. Walker is as follows: 
Transcript 765: 
Q. That is a generalized statement. I would 
like you to now tell me precisely, based on your review 
of this record, what the nursing staff of the LDS Hospital 
failed to do in the treatment of this patient. 
A. I feel they failed to recognize the emo-
tional problem, in terms of this man's acute toxic psy-
chosis, number one, and then to exercise the care of 
watching him prior to, during and after the time of the 
psychiatric evaluation. 
Transcript 767: 
Q. Is it your statement that their failure to 
require the doctors, after they have called this situation 
to the doctors' attention, is a failure on their part to 
meet an accepted medical standard? 
A. Yes, it is. 
The testimony following has to do with the fact 
that the hospital social worker (an employee of the hospital) 
noted the psychiatric condition of Farrow and brought it 
to the attention of Dr. Schricker. However, it was two 
.23. 
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days later that Dr. Schricker acted and it was not w 
later that night that the psychiatrist finally appea: 
The testimony concerning this event is found at Tr" 
Q. All right. He called this to the at~ 
of the doctor on the 21st. On the 23rd the doctor,' 
treating physician, does call in a psychiatrist for: 
psychiatric evaluation. Is it your position that t~ 
social worker or the supervising nurses should have' 
these doctors react more swiftly than they did? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And they have the authority and contr~ 
of that? 
A. They certainly do. 
Q. So they are supposed to diagnose the ac 
ness of this patient and then tell the doctor what ~ 
A. I am not asking for them to make a dim 
They are responsible for taking inunediate action. 
If this man should come into the emergency 
without an airway open and one doctor doesn't open tr 
airway, it is necessary for the staff to get a doctor 
that will open the airway. 
Q. Let's stay with the facts. We have g~ 
a patient that is disoriented and it appears to thel 
ees of thE hospital maybe he needs a psJchiatric ex~ 
tion. It is your position, your professional posit~ 
now as an expert in the case, that the failure of thl 
hospital to insist that Dr. Schricker act more swift! 
than he did is a failure of the hospital to sustaina 
cepted medical practice? 
A. Yes. 
The doctor testified that the hospital fail 
to move the patient to the psychiatric ward, Tr. 80( 
that the hospital had responsibility in regard to the 
medication given, Tr. 801 - 802; and on the assumpt~ 
. 24. 
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that the nursing care given after the visit by Dr. 
Moench was merely normal and routine, the hospital would 
be guilty of negligence. 
Q. Assume, doctor, after he (Moench) visited 
the patient that the nurses only made routine and normal 
checks and did nothing else. Would you consider that 
to be an act of negligence on the part of the hospital? 
A. Yes. 
His testimony is best summed up in a letter 
to counsel which is contained in the transcript at page 
846: 
"In conclusion, it would appear that Mr. Farrow's 
acute psychotic reaction when unidentified by the hospital 
personnel or attending physicians who, if they had taken 
appropriate measures for diagnosis and correction of the 
situation, would have avoided the patient's catastrophic 
actions." 
The deposition of Dr. Walker must be considered 
by the Court in its entirety so that the full panoply 
of medical thought will be evident. The negligence of 
the doctor ~nd hospital is apparent from this testimony 
alone and precludes the granting of summary judgment. 
There is much additional evidence. 
Frances Funk, R.N. 
Frances Funk was an expert witness for the 
plaintiff. Her deposition was taken by the hospital and 
was before the Court for the motion for summary judgment. 
Mrs. Funk had been a long-time employee of the LDS Hospital 
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and was retired at the time. She was at the hospital 
during the week that the accident to Farrow occurred 
was aware that he had been a problem patient. (Depos 
Page 43.) Significant portions of her testimony fol} 
Page 29. 
Q. So the psychiatric problem was noted, w 
known, and was called to the attention of the doctor; 
isn't that right? 
A. That's right and that is why it seems t' 
me that the nurses should have certainly been aware t 
this patient needed closer observation and needed m~ 
help. 
Page 32. 
A. I think they were aware of this patie~ 
problem from the time he was admitted. 
Page 51. 
Q. In your opinion there was nothing given 
this man other than routine care; is that correct? 
A. Routine custodial care. 
Q. Given the circumstances of Dr. Moench's 
visit, would appropriate nursing care in this case h~ 
dictated that this man be restrained? 
A. Yes, and not being a psychiatric nurse, 
would-- (objections) 
The Witness: Let me finish. I would want: 
be very careful how I observe that patient. 
Q. If I have that correctly, then, without 
being a psychiatric nurse, but being an RN. 
A. Right. 
Page 53. 
Q. And does this record indicate to you, tl 
nurse's record, that this man was given the surveillm 
• 26. 
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and observation that Dr. Moench recommended? 
A No. 
NOTE 
A most significant element relating to the 
liability of the hospital is the medication ordered by 
Dr. Moench. Had it been given when ordered and in the 
correct dosages this tragedy could have been prevented. 
Dr. Moench ordered 100 milligrams of Mellaril "stat" 
(meaning "right now") at eight o'clock p.m. The medica-
tion was not actually given until ten o'clock p.m. 
(See medical record.) 
On this very important note, Mrs. Funk testi-
fied as follows: 
Deposition Page 45. 
Q When a doctor given an order stat, what 
does that mean to a nurse? What is the meaning of that? 
What must they do? 
A It means it is supposed to be done immediately. 
Q Now, if an order is issued at 8:00 stat for 
100 milligrrnas of Mellaril and it is given at 10:00 p.m., 
is that compliance with the doctor's order? 
A No. 
Deposition Page 46. 
Q. Should prescriptions have been given im-
mediately? 
A. Yes, it should have • 
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Q. And is that also one of your areas ofc 
cern here concerning this man's care? 
A. Yes. 
Mary E. Vaughn, RN 
Mary E. Vaughn's deposition was before t~ 
Court on motion for summary judgment. Mrs. Vaughn he 
been an RN since 1942 and for 24 years, to 1974, she 
was night supervisor at the LDS Hospital. Althoughr 
a supervisor at the time, she was on duty at the ho~ 
the night Mr. Farrow jumped from the window. Aftert 
accident Mrs. Vaughn talked to Diane Karren (the nurs 
duty at the time of the accident) . This was Diane ~ 
first night on duty after coming off of vacation. ~ 
not read the chart or the consultation note of Dr. ~ 
before this tragic event. From the deposition at pag 
20: 
" ... Oh, by the way, that ~ight Diane Karrm 
told me that this patient had been restrained previm 
to this night that he went out the window and he had 
up in the halls walking around but this is while she 
was on vacation, she told me." 
Deposition Page 11. 
Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether tl 
nurses performed and did the things that they were ~ 
posed to do that evening or didn't do what they were 
supposed to? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You have that opinion? 
• 28. 
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A. I have my own opinion 
Q. It is a personal opinion? 
A. It is my own opinion. 
Q. What areas do you have in mind with ref-
erence to that opinion? 
A. Well, after being supervisor that many 
years, I was always concerned about the safety of the 
hospital. 
Q. What do you mean by the safety of the 
hospital? 
A. Well, you are always thinking for the safety 
of the patient and the safety of the hospital. 
Q. But do you have an area where you think that 
the nurses may not have done everything they were supposed 
to have done that evening? 
A. Well, with a patient like Mr. Farrow, I 
would have said that he should have been posied or had a 
restraint on, especially after Dr. Moench had been in 
at eight o'clock that evening. That was quite a late 
time to be going in to see a patient on consultation. 
Q. Okay. Define for the record what you mean 
by posied. 
A. It is a belt that goes around them and 
ties them ~nd they have locked ones and they have ones that 
do not lock around their waist. 
Her further testimony was to the effect that 
the nurse on duty had not read the consultation report of 
Dr. Moench and that she stated to Mrs. Vaughn that had she 
read it she would have taken other changes (measures?), 
Page 42. Farrow was awake at midnight and should have 
been asleep if he had had 100 milligrams of Mellaril, 
Page 42. While she did not expect the nurse to be con-
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stantly in Farrow's room, she did expect that them 
would do more than just open the door and look in. 
nurse on duty should liave assured herself that Farr( 
was sleeping and not merely open the door and look : 
Tr. 74. 
Again, nurse Vaughn also stated that when 
doctor makes an order "stat" it means immediately. 
67. 
The Court is again directed to the matter 
medication. On the 10th day of September, 1975, bo1 
the deposition of Craig Jackson, a pharmisist at t~ 
Hospital, and Karen Pool, the nurse on duty when Dr 
Moench visited, were taken. Mr. Jackson was asked 
give the particulars as to how the prescription for 
Mellaril would have been filled. The doctor ordere1 
100 milligrams stat and then 50 milligrams every fo1 
hours and as needed. Mellaril comes in several amo1 
from 15 milligrams to 200 milligrams and the tablet: 
are different colors for different amounts. Tr. 97: 
Customarily, with a prescription such as was given 
Farrow, the pharmicist would put twelve 50 milligrru 
tablets to fill the 100 milligram prescription and 1 
thereafter would give one tablet to fill the 50 mil: 
gram prescription. Tr. 969 . 
. 30. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Nurse Karen Pool who gave the medication testified 
as follows: Tr. 1029. 
Q. How many pills did you give him? 
A. One. 
Q. One? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he take that pill? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you sure? 
A. Yes. 
A very curious thing occurred after this 
deposition was taken. At the time this deposition was 
signed by Miss Pool, almost one year later, on the 23rd 
day of August, 1976, she changed her testimony, gave no 
reasons therefor and it now reads as follows: 
Q. How Many pills did you give him? 
A. One or two, depending on the dosage sent 
up by the ~harmacy. KP 
Q. One? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he take that pill? 
A. Yes, if a 100 mg pill was sent up. KP 
This young, inexperienced nurse (at most 
three months out of nursing school, and not yet an RN) 
gave Farrow only one-half the Mellaril dosage prescribed 
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By Dr. Moench. Negligence on the part of the hospit 
is proven and corroborated by nurse Vaughn in her de 
sition when she states that Farrow should have been 
asleep at midnight (he was not) if he had been given 
milligrams of Mellaril at 10:00 p.m. (Mellaril is a 
major tranquilizer.) 
A mistake in medication had been made andt 
hospital knew it as soon as the two depositions were 
taken. The result-- the nurse changed her testimony 
gave no reasons therefor. 
This is so patently offensive that the lo• 
court should have ignored the testimony change on t~ 
motion for sununary judgment. 
Further on the matter of medication. The 
August 23, medication order of Dr. Moench is as fol~ 
"Mellaril 100 mg stat. 
Dalmane 30 mg hs prn. 
50 mg qid and prn 
D/C Nembutal." 
Dr. Moench finished his work and left the hospital ~ 
8:00 p.m. He talked to nurse Pool before he left. I 
find, however, that nurse Pool did not acknowledge th: 
prescription order until 8:50 p.m., almost one hour li 
Referring to the medication chart, we find that shed 
not give the Mellaril to Farrow until 10: 00 p .m. The: 
is no explanation for this delay. Simply stated, wher 
a doctor gives an order "stat" meaning that it shouN 
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carried out immediately, there is absolutely no excuse 
for a two hour delay. Had the medication,been given 
timely the tragic accjdent to Farrow would have been 
avoided. 
That is not all the evidence of negligence re-
lating to medication. The only medication given Farrow 
after the visit of Dr. Moench was the half dosage of 
Mellaril. That was given at 10:00 p.m. He was to have 
50 milligrams at least every four hours and even more 
if it was needed. He jumped out of the window at 2:40 
a.m. Obviously, the nurses should have given him more 
Mellaril by at least 2:00 a.m. Additionally, Dr. Moench 
ordered 30 milligrams of Dalmane (a sleeping pill) at 
bedtime and as needed. The sleeping pill was never given. 
Mr. Farrow was awake at midnight according to the note 
made by the LPN (hospital record, page 208). Dr. Moench 
obviously wanted Mr. Farrow tranquilized and asleep for 
that night. Had the nurses carried out his orders (which 
they did not do) this tragedy would have been avoided. 
In addition to the medication ordered by Dr. 
Moench, he made a further directive to the hospital staff. 
On page 69 of the hospital records, he states: 
" Q) Repeated reassurance by direct nurse 
contact (nurse entering room, standing by 
bed while talking)." 
Nurse Pool was familiar with this order at the 
time it was written by Dr. Moench. Tr. 1027. Nurse 
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Pool testified that she gave Farrow a pill at lO:OOr 
This was noted in the hospital chart. She testified 
she saw him again at 11:00 p.m. as she was going off 
duty. In a three-hour period she visited his room b 
This is hardly the frequent contact ordered by Dr. ~ 
The LPN on duty at the time visited Farrow's room at 
10:00 and said she saw him on another occasion. Ho* 
the only visit that is charted is the 10:00 p.m. vi~ 
At 11:00 p.m. a shift change occurred at tl 
hospital. Nurse Pool and LPN Callahan turned the fk 
over to nurse Diane Karren and LPN Judy Hall. The dij 
of Diane Karren was before the court at the time oft 
motion for summary judgment. She worked three days 
a week for the hospital and this was her first shift 
a two-week vacation. Tr. 1052. Her only knowledge 
Mr. Farrow was gained from nurse Karen Pool who precE 
her on duty. She was told that Dr. Moench had beeni 
and that he had requested that Mr. Farrow be watched. 
Tr. 1057. According to Diane Karren, the number of n 
on a ward depended upon the type of patient on the fl 
Nurse Karren and LPN Hall were the only two on dutya 
11:00 p.m. (Except for the personnel in the intens~ 
care unit, and they were not involved with the pati~ 
on the floor.) At times, there were three people on 
duty on the neuro floor depending upon the nature of 
• 34. 
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patients. When asked about this, nurse Karren responded 
that a third person would be needed if someone had to be 
watched extra closely, that you could not trust. Farrow 
was such a person and this was apparent from the con-
sultation note of Dr. Moench: Tr. 1056-57 
"His tension is very high; his anxiety 
level very high; his distortion of reality 
may lead to acts of poor judgment." 
It was usually the responsibility of the afternoon shift 
to request additional help. Tr. 1057. The night shift 
could demand extra help but sometimes they would get it 
and sometimes not. Tr. 1057. Furthermore, this was a 
busy night on that floor. There is space for 22 patients 
and the floor was virtually full on that evening. Tr. 
1048 - 1050 - 1063. A need for extra help existed but 
help was never requested. 
During the very critical period of time when 
something could have been done for Mr. Farrow, nursing 
care completely failed. From 11:00 p.m. until 2:40 a.m., 
u period of about four hours, Farrow was visited only 
once and that was by the LPN and not by the registered 
nurse. At 1:30 a.m. nurse Karren did open the door to 
Farrow's room and look in, but she did not know whether 
he was asleep. Tr. 1061-62. This hardly complies with 
the "direct nurse contact ordered by Dr. Moench. Tr. 
1273. 
"I suggested also that their checking on him 
included them going into his room and not 
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just looking through the door, to go to hl 
bedside, to identify themselves, and to 
ask how he was, and to ask if he needed 
anything." 
The subject of medication also came up in· 
deposition of nurse Karren. She testified as foll~ 
Tr. 1062. 
Q. Do you recall if he had any medicatioo 
take that night? 
A. That I had to give him? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No. No. 
Q. You say he did not, or you don't rec al 
A. No, I didn't have any. 
Q. No order for medication? 
A. No. 
As pointed out in detail above, both Mella: 
and Dalmane had been ordered for Farrow and shouldh 
been giver to him by nurse Karren. Yet, she denies: 
any medication order existed. Unbelievable! 
From the record it must be concluded that! 
·schricker and the hospital are liable. At the very 
an issue of liability is present. Dr. Schricker, th 
attending physician, failed to heed the fact that ~ 
told him that he had had a bad reaction to a prior' 
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cation (anesthesia); failed to move Farrow from the room 
he was in, although it had been requested; failed to 
recognize that Farrow had become psychotic after the 
operation; and failed to secure the assistance of a 
specialist until too late. (The record will show that 
Dr. Schricker took no action on the matter until it was 
demanded by a social worker and then a specialist was not 
summoned until over two days later.) Had he responded 
promptly as he should have, this tragedy would have been 
avoided. 
The negligence of the hospital results from an 
impressive catalog of failures and omissions: 
1. When the hospital personnel knew that Mr. 
Farrow needed psychiatric help they were obligated to 
step in and do something about it when the attending 
physician failed to act. Darling v Charleston Conununity 
Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill 2d 326, 211 NE2d 253, 14 ALR 
3d 860; 
2. Failure to change his room when he requested 
to be moved; 
3. Provided only routine custodial care when 
much more care was indicated; 
4. Failure to provide surveillance or restraint 
and direct nurse contact when indicated and ordered by 
Dr. Moench; 
.37. 
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5. Failure to take reasonable steps to p~ 
Farrow from "acts of poor judgment"; 
6. Failed to provide extra personnel when: 
nurses knew that Farrow was a patient that needed to! 
watched; 
7. Delayed two hours in giving Farrow rnefu 
tion that had been ordered "stat" and then --
8. Gave only one-half the prescribed dos~ 
and then 
9. Failed to give the sleeping medication. 
ordered; and 
10. Totally ignored the medication order af 
10:00 p.m. 
A case of striking resemblance to this one 
the Kentucky case of Lexington Hospital, Inc. vs ~il 
245 SW2d 927. In that case the plaintiff suffered fi 
epilepsy. After an epileptic seizure he would have 
paranoid delusions imagining he was in a German pri~ 
with spies all around and without warning would rune 
and hide. The hospital knew of his anxiety symptoms 
paranoid delusions when he was admitted. After hewa 
admitted, he did in fact escape one time. (It will t 
recalled that the hospital records and nurse Pool's 1 
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mony reflect the fact that Farrow was found wondering 
and confused in the hall of the LDS Hospital.) On the 
day following the esc~pe, the attendants left the plaintiff 
unattended and unwatched. He went into a bathroom, 
smashed the window and fell to a sidewalk two stories 
below. The Court held that: 
"In the present case the defendant had 
recognized in its written contract the 
need of restraint of the patient. It had 
been expressly advised of his sudden and 
intermittent fits of aboration and of 
his trait to flee in his delirium. It 
had let the patient get away a few days 
before, so received adequate warning 
from its own experience. This emphasized 
the need of special care and protection 
to prevent a recurrence. Despite all 
this, the patient had been left alone with-
out surveillance long enough to enter 
another room, break out the window and 
fall to the ground." 
Verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed. 
Another case in close parallel is that of E. W. 
Misfeldt v Hospital Authority of the City of Marietta, 
115 SE2d 244 (Ga.) Plaintiff's_ wife was admitted to the 
hospital with the diagosis of paranoid schizophrenia. 
From the opinion: 
"The case, construed in favor of the plain-
tiff, thus presents us with the tragic results 
of divided responsibility. The physician in 
charge felt he had made plain to the hos-
pital authorities that the patient was men-
tally disturbed, and, being on the hospital 
staff, he undoubtedly supposed that such a 
patient would at no time be left to her own 
devices contrary to hospital regulations • 
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The admissions clerk felt she had repre-
sented the case to the superintendent of 
admissions if anything too strongly, be-
cause she received a rebuke from that 
source at her specific indication of the 
"psycho room." The superintendent con-
tended she was not told the patient might 
become violent, that her appearance was 
normal, and that she accordingly awaited 
further instructions from the director of 
nurses. The director never entered the 
picture. The floor nurse relied upon any 
lack of special instructions to herself ~ 
guard the patient, and, as to the mediciM, 
she contended that the words on the pre-
scription "Q.I.D." instead of "stat" indi-
cated to her that there was no reason for 
prompt medication, but only that the medi-
cines, after they were obtained, would be 
administered in routine fashion. 
[4] From the above there can be no 
doubt but that there was some evidence, at 
least, to sustain the allegations of negl~ 
gence. The hospital did have notice of t~ 
patient's mentally distrubed condition, a~ 
it ~annot be said as a matter of law that 
they were freed from responsibility becauR 
this notice was not in writing contained in 
the specific instructio~s brought to them 
by the patient's husband at the physician's 
request. There was enough evidence as to 
the patient's appearance on arrival to make 
a jury issue as to whethe~ trained staff 
members should not then have recognized 
her irresponsible condition. They did not, 
rightly or wrongly, keep constant watch 
over her, and they did allow her to wander 
away by herself. The particular tranquil-
izer on which the physician undoubtedly r~ 
lied should have been given at the regular 
4 p.m. administration of medicine. Wheth~ 
had it been sent for in time, it would 
have been available for that purpose, and 
whether the delay in sending for it cons ti-. 
tuted negligence, were also jury questions. 
The Court ruled that the lower court did ~ 
cmruni t error in failing to direct a verdict for the d 
fendant. 
A fl 
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Accidents such as occurred to the plaintiff 
in this case are not that rare and unusual. Many 
similar cases are reported on 70 ALR 2d 347. A good 
summary of law is stated on page 348 of that annotation. 
"The ordinary rule that the duty of a 
hospital toward its patients is to exer-
cise such reasonable care for their safety 
as their known mental and physical con-
dition may require, and that in a proper 
case this duty may extend to affording 
reasonable protection against self-inflicted 
injury, has frequently been recognized in 
actions for injury or death to a patient 
alleged to have resulted from his escape 
or attempt to escape." 
See also, Kent v Whitaker, 364 P2d 556, (Wash.); 
Vistica v Presbyterian Hospital and Medical Center, 432 
P2d 193 (Cal. App.); Wood v Samaritan Institution, Inc., 
161 P2d 556 (Cal.); Hunt v King County, 481 P2d 593 
(Wash.); Meier v Ross General Hospital, 445 P2d 519 (Cal.) 
(Approving the doctrine of res ispa loquitur in similar 
cases.) 
The evidence before the court on motion for 
summary judgment was that the hospital knew that Mr. 
Farrow was suffering from hallucinations; that he was 
confused; had wandered in the hall; and that a psychiatric 
consultation was needed. Then when the psychiatrist 
finally arrived the nurse read his note while he was 
making it and would know that "his tension was very high; 
his anxiety level was very high; his distortion of reality 
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may lead to acts of poor judgment" and "if aud. hall 
cinations don't subside promptly, may have to movet 
3 North (psychiatric ~ard) for safety." 
The failure to provide restraint, surveill 
and medication for the plaintiff is detailed above. 
Additionally, the testimony of the experts convictt 
hospital of negligence. At the very least, the li~ 
of the hospital was a question to be submitted to lli 
jury. 
The summary judgment is not, and should no: 
a favorite of the law. It deprives a litigant of hi: 
right to a trial before a court or jury. It should' 
granted only with great reluctance and only then if 
clearly appears that the party against whom the jud~ 
would be g~anted cannot possibly establish a right t 
recover. Rule 56 has given rise to more litigation 
and appellate practice than any of the other rules ~ 
civil procedure. A recent statement of the court u 
tive to summary judgment is set forth in the case of 
~s McGovern, 551 P2d 1266: 
"However, inasmuch as the party moved 
against is being defeated without the 
privilege of a trial, the court should 
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carefully scrutinize the 'submissions' 
and contensions he makes thereon to see 
if his contensions and proposals as to 
proof of material facts, resolved in his 
favor, would entitle him to prevail; 
and if it so appears, the motion for 
summary judgment should be denied and 
the trial should be had for the purpose 
of resolving the disputed issues of fact 
and determine the rights of the parties." 
For other statements of the Rule see Brandt 
vs Springville Bank & Company, 10 Utah 2d 350 353 P2d 
460; Tanner vs Utah Poultry & Farmers Co-op, 11 Utah 2d 
353 359 P2d 18. 
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POINT II: THE JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS UPON THE VE~: 
MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S IN~ 
WAS FORESEEABLE AND DEFENDANTS HAD A DUTY 
TO PROTECT HH1 FROM THAT RISK. 
The LDS Hospital Progress Notes (Defenda~ 
Exhibit 1) on the plaintiff reveal a marked patternt 
mental instability. Dr. Schricker noted on August l~ 
and 19 the plaintiff was confused. On the 20th, Kent 
Griffiths, M.S.W., noted that a long discussion with 
plaintiff revealed an "extensive history of personal 
and marital difficulties ... " and that, "his confus~ 
seems to revolve around the lack of any consistent me 
to the significant relationships in his life." On~ 
21, Mr. Griffiths asked Dr. Schricker to consider a" 
consult" on the plaintiff. To this request, Dr. Sc~ 
answered, "Yes!" On August 22, Mr. Griffiths wrote i 
the notes that there were definitely problems that "n 
psychiatric, if not other forms of counseling." On A. 
23, the plaintiff himself asked for psychiatric help. 
That evening the plaintiff was visited by Dr. Moench. 
LDS Hospital "Report of Consultation" signed by Dr. Mt 
at 8:00 p.m., August 23, stated that: 
"At present he (the plaintiff) is very te~ 
says he hears voices of 2 to 4 persons -- iI 
hall + ceiling, talking about (not to) him, 
keeping him under surveillance, accusing hir 
of being a sex fiend, etc., etc.," 
Dr. Moench then entered his impressions, "2 . 
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Present eppisode is either a dissociative Reaction or a 
Paranoid schizophrenic reaction. His tension is very 
high; his distortion of reality may lead to acts of poor 
judgment."; and suggestions "4. If aud. Hallucinations 
don't subside promptly may have to move to 3 North for 
safety." 3 North is the psychiatric ward of LDS Hospital. 
Six hours later, Chester E. Farrow went out the window 
of his room on the sixth floor of LDS Hospital. 
At the trial the court read the following 
instruction to the jury: 
"If you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that the plaintiff intentionally 
jumped from the window in an attempt to 
commit suicide, he is not entitled to 
recover from defendants, and you must find 
against him, and for the defendants, no 
cause of action." Trial 483. 
The thrust of this instruction is that a psy-
chiatrist who has undertaken to care for a patient with 
notice that he has severe psychiatric problems that may 
lead to acts of poor judgment, has no duty to protect 
that person from those acts of poor judgment. 
This is not the law in other states and should 
not be the law in Utah. "Those charged with the care and 
treatment of a patient, who know of facts from which it 
might reasonably be concluded that a patient would be 
likely to harm himself in the absence of preclusive 
measures, must use reasonable care to prevent such harm." 
Meier vs. Ross General Hospital, 71 Cal. Rptr. 903, 445 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
P2d 519, 525. (1968). Also see Fleming v Prince 
George's Countv, 277 Md. 655, 358 A2d 892 (1976). 
The trial court's instruction would have 
been proper had the defendant been a layman. "Gen-
erally, courts are reluctant to impose civil liabil~ 
for another's act of suicide. This is partly due to 
the following paradox. 'If suicide is a deliberatei 
tentional act by an individual how can one person be 
civilly liable for causing the suicide of another?'" 
Note, the Liability of Psychiatrists for Malpracti~, 
University of Pittsburg Law Review, 108, page 110. f 
the defendant is not a layman--he is a doctor holdinc 
himself out as a specialist in the disorders of the! 
mind. His patients rely on his specialized skill anc 
training and he holds a position of trust regarding 
their well-being. "In the psychiatrist-patient rela'. 
ship, there is an affirmative duty to prevent suicifu 
ibid at page 110. Plaintiff's exp'. rt witness, Dr.~ 
Walker, III, testified at his deposition that "You ar 
obliged to take the steps to prevent suicide, yes, ye 
are." Tr. 7 4 6. 
The scope of the duty "is to exercise persc 
ally or by means of orders and instructions to hospit 
personnel, reasonable restraint and observation." W 
Tort Liability of the Psychiatrist, 16 Buffalo Law & 
649, 666. Of course, what is reasonable in each ca~ 
. 46. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
depends on the psychiatric condition of the patient. 
ibid. In other words, the psychiatrist must at least 
partially base his determination as to the course of 
treatment the patient will receive on the foreseeability 
that the patient will in some manner harm himself. D. 
Dawidoff, The Malpractice of Psychiatrists (1973). 
Plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. C. H. Hardin Branch, 
testified at his deposition on August 4, 1977, that Mr. 
Farrow's psychiatric condition was such that it justified 
more protection than he was given in this situation. 
Trial 867. Plus, defendant Louis G. Moench, as reflected 
in his Consultation Report, recognized that plaintiff was 
a hazard to himself. Clearly, there was at least a jury 
question on whether or not Dr. Moench fulfilled his 
duty to the plaintiff based on Mr. Farrow's psychiatric 
state. However, that question was never considered by 
the jury because the effect of instruction No. 19 was to 
grant the defendants a directed verdict if the jury found 
that the plaintiff "intentionally jumped from the window 
in an attempt to commit suicide." The instruction was 
thus erroneous because the jury was told that an irration-
al act by the plaintiff, with no qualifying instructions 
as to foreseeability of that act and as to Dr. Moench's 
duty to protect the plaintiff from that act, will relieve 
the defendant of any liability. The law is that a physi-
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cian has a duty to safeguard his patients against a~ 
due to mental incapacity by exercising personally, m 
means of orders and instructions to hospital personnE 
reasonable restraint and observation and the jury s~ 
have been instructed to that effect. 
The impact and effect of the intentional ac 
instruction is magnified by instruction 20 relatingt 
proximate cause. (This instruction is not a good st 
ment of proximate cause and unduly emphasizes the cor. 
There is an earlier instruction covering the subject. 
Here the jury is told that even if they find Dr. Moer. 
negligent, nonetheless, he would not be liable is his 
negligence did not cause the event when the jury co~ 
sidered these two instructions together, they could1 
have found Dr. Moench negligent; but have further foo 
that plaintiff intentionally jumped from the window; 
therefore, plaintiff could not recover. The theorys 
forth by the court in the two instructions is erronec 
Even further, the wording of the two instructions is 
couched in such manner that the jury had no choice u 
thus, the court, in essence, directed a verdict agah 
plaintiff. 
Accordingly, this case must be remanded fm 
new trial. 
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POINT III: THE JUDGMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANTS 
MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE LOCALITY 
RULE, UNDER WHICH THE OPINIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S 
EXPERT WITNESS WERE NOT ALLOWED INTO EVIDENCE 
AND WHICH WAS THE BASIS OF THE STANDARD OF 
CARE INSTRUCTION GIVEN THE JURY, IS A LEGAL 
ANACHRONISM AND MUST BE REJECTED AS THE 
RULE OF LAW IN UTAH. 
On Tuesday, July 27, 1976, defendants deposed 
plaintiff's expert witness, Sydney Walker, III, M.D., a 
specialist in neuropsychiatry. Prior to the deposition, 
Dr. Walker had personally examined the plaintiff, re-
viewed the LDS Hospital records that pertained to the 
plaintiff, examined plaintiff's records from the San 
Diego Veterans Administration Hospital, and reviewed 
the depositions of Karen Pool, Dr. Louis G. Moench, Craig 
Jackson, Betty Farrow, John K. Griffiths, Julie Ann 
Hanson, Dr. Louis J. Schricker, Diane Karren, and of the 
plaintiff, Chester Farrow. (Pages 17 and 18, deposition 
of Sydney Walke~, III.) At this deposition, Dr. Walker 
testified that in his opinion defendant Health Services 
Corporation, defendant Louis G. Moench, M.D., and defen-
dant Louis J. Schricker, M.D. failed to properly care 
for the plaintiff, according to accepted standards of 
medical care and that this failure to care for the 
plaintiff resulted in his injuries. The trial judge re-
fused to allow the opinions of Dr. Walker, as stated in 
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his deposition, to be admitted into evidence because 
had never practiced medicine in Utah, and thus, the 
reasoning went, was incompetent to testify as to the 
medical standard of care in this state. 
stated: 
The 11th instruction the court read to the ju: 
"You are instructed that if you find that 
the defendant Dr. Moench, in prescribing the 
drug Mellaril to treat the plaintiff's 
psychosis and the drug Dalmane for sleeping 
and instructing the nurse to repeatedly 
reassure the plaintiff by direct contact 
consisting of entering his room and standing 
by his bed while talking to him, complied 
with accepted standards of psychiatric care 
in this community, you should return a 
verdict in favor of the defendant." 
Instruction 11, insofar as it makes the ap-
plicable standard of care against which Dr. Moench's 
conduct was to be judged, that of accepted standards1 
psychiatric care "in this community" (emphasis added), 
correctly states the Utah position regarding the "l~ 
cality rule". That position is this: 
"In malpractice cases, whether a physician 
or surgeon is negligent in the treatment 
of a patient depends upon whether he has 
used or failed to use the ordinarv care and 
skill required of doctors in the community 
which he serves." Anderson v Nixon, 104 
Utah 262, 139 P2d 216, 218. 
As a rule of law, the locality rule is out of touch wi 
medical reality. 
The root of the locality rule goes back to th' 
19th Century and is found in cases such as Small v. H 
.so. 
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128 Mass. 131, 35 Am Rep. 363 (1880). (Overruled by 
Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 NE2d 703 (1968).) At that time, 
long before the advent of the automobile, the airplane, 
radio or television, persons were admitted to medical 
.school if they had a high school diploma or its equiva-
lent. Upon gradutaion, the practitioner was given an 
M.D. Degree and turned loose upon the world, in most 
cases never again to see the inside of a medical school 
classroom or be brought up to date on the latest develop-
ments of medical care. Obtaining a license to practice 
medicine was a formality. Wiggins v. Piver, 276 NC 134, 
171 SE2d 393 (1970). Transportation and communication 
systems were primitive. "Then, except for a few stops 
on the railroads, the quickest mode of travel was by 
'coach and four'. Forty miles between sunup and sundown 
was a full days travel--less than fifty minutes will 
suffice today." 171 SE2d at 396-397. 
With this state of affairs the courts quite 
rightly felt that it was unjust to apply the same stand-
ard of care to city doctors and to their country cousins. 
Circumstances, to coin a phrase, have changed. 
Travel times that used to be measured in days and weeks 
are now calculated in terms of hours. A doctor can pick 
up a telephone in Salt Lake City and speak with a col-
league in Boston at a cost of a few dollars. "New 
• 51. 
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techniques and discoveries are available to all doctru 
within a short period of time through medical journa~ 
closed circuit television presentations, special radh 
networks for doctors, tape recorded digests of medical 
literature, and current correspondence courses." Nob 
An Evaluation of Changes in the Medical Standard of 
Care, 23 Vanderbilt Law Review 729, 732. There havet 
great improvements in the quality of medical schools; 
those accepted for admittance thereto. In addition, t 
states have toughened up their licensing requirements 
for doctors. Note - Negligence - Medical Malpracti~ 
The Locality Rule, 18 De Paul Law Review 328. The St 
of Utah now requires all physicians and surgeons to he 
a degree from a medical school approved by the Deparu 
of Business Regulation, to have successfully complete( 
twelve months of hospital internship training, and~ 
pass an examination in anatomy, hist0logy, bacteriol~ 
biochemistry, pathology and physiology. (Sections• 
31 and Section 58-27-6 Utah Code Ann.) 
The reason for the foregoing historical bm 
ground is to show that the conditions that led to a di 
ference in the standard of medical care from one plaa 
another no longer exist. In fact, at least within m~ 
specialties, the standard of medical care is uniform 
throughout the country . 
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In 1962 the Stanford Law Review conducted a 
survey of the practice of medicine by specialists prac-
ticing within their specialities. Its conclusion: The 
practice of medicine by physicians within their medical 
specialities is similar throughout the nation. Medical 
Specialities and the Locality Rule, 14 Stanford Law Re-
view 884. 
The locality rule has several very real and 
practical difficulties which serve to wreak manifest in-
justice upon those unfortunate enough to be injured by a 
doctor's or hospital's negligence: 
First, professional people are reluctant to 
testify against their colleagues in the community, Pederson 
v. Dumochel, 431 P2d 973, Wash. (1967). In point of fact, 
plaintiff's attorney in this case contacted a number of 
doctors in Utah to solicit (1) their opinion regarding 
possible liability on the part of the defendants and (2) 
testimony in line with their opinions. They believed that 
there was liability but refused to testify. Tr. 155. 
Second, "the possibility of a small group who, 
by their laxness or carelessness could establish a local 
s.tandard of care that was below that which the law re-
quires." 431 P2d at 977; 
Third, since the locality rule dictates that 
the standard of care be that of other doctors in the 
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community, the plaintiff is barred from bringing in 
expert witnesses from outside the community because,. 
reasoning goes, not being familiar with the situati~ 
in the community, he is not competent to testify ast 
the standard of medical care. This is in total dis~ 
gard of the fact that, at least as far as specialisb 
there is no difference in the standard of medical c~ 
from community to community and in disregard of thef 
that the defendant may be an acknowledged expert inl 
field who has access to the latest developments in & 
field of medicine. Such is the case here. 
Defendant Louis G. Schricker has a bachelor. 
degree, an M.D. degree and spent almost six and one~ 
years as an intern/resident before being certified ~ 
American Board of Neurological surgery. For almost f, 
years Dr. Schricker was Chief of Neurologic Surgeryi 
Fitzsimmons Army Hospital in Denver, Colorado. Tr. l' 
Since 1957 he has been an associate professor of new 
logic surgery at the University of Utah College of Me 
cine. (Deposition of Dr. Louis J. Schricker, page 5. 
Defendant Louis G. Moench is a Phi Beta Kappa and a 
graduate of the University of Chicago Medical School, 
diplomate of the American Board of Internal Medicine< 
for a period of six years a preceptor under the vice 
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chairman of the American Board of Internal Medicine. Dr. 
Moench received post-graduate training in psychiatry in 
McLain Hospital, the University of California at San 
Francisco and the Utah State Hospital in Provo. Tr. 1856. 
He currently is an associate clinical professor at the 
University of Utah School of Medicine, (Deposition of 
Louis G. Moench, page 3.) having been associated with the 
medical school since 1945 in the departments of Medicine 
and Psychiatry. Tr. 1857. 
In addition, at Dr. Schricker's deposition he 
stated that there are several excellent medical libraries 
in Salt Lake City, including one at the LOS Hospital and 
one at the University of Utah. 
J. Schricker, page 9.) 
(Deposition of Louis 
Defendant Health Services Corporation, for-
merly known as LOS Hospital, is affiliated with the 
University .,f Utah Medical School as a teaching hospital. 
The outstanding credentials of the defendants 
in this case highlight the unreasonableness of refusing 
the testimony of specialists from outside Salt Lake City 
because of a rule which was designed to protect the poorly 
trained, poorly equipped practitioner of the healing 
arts who did not have access to the latest advancements 
in medical care. 
The argument against the Utah locality rule is now 
complete. Its origins are in the days when Utah had not even 
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achieved statehood. In the time between then and now 
there have been vast improvements in the quality of m, 
cal education, medical students, post-graduate trai~ 
and continuing education. In the interim has come ~ 
automobile, the airplane, radio, television, and tele· 
phone. The states now rigorously test physicians ~f 
allowing them to practice within their boundaries. 1 
the locality rule is the law, unless the plaintiff is 
able to convince the trial judge that res ipsa loquil 
should apply, the injured party is effectively cut~ 
from seeking redress of his grievances in the courts 
to an inability to produce a "qualified" expert witne 
to testify as to the standard of medical care in the 
community. 
In line with the above reasoning, seven st 
in the last eleven years have rejected the localityr 
as the statement of the standard of care in medical 
1 2 3 
malpractice cases: Iowa; Kentucky; Maryland; Mass 
chusetts; 4 North Carolina; 5 Washington6 and Wiscons~ 
1 Speed v. State, 249 NW2d 901, (1976); 2 Blair v. Er 
461 SW2d 370, (1970); 3 Shilkret v Anapolis Hospital 
Association, 276 Md., 349 Atlantic 2d 245 (1975); 4 ~ 
v. Belinkoff, 235 NE2d 793 (1968); 5 Wiggins v. Pi~ 
N.C. 134, 171 SE2d 393 (1970); 6 Pederson v. oumo~ 
P2d 973 (1967); 7 Shier v. Freeman, 58 Wis. 2d 269,1 
166 (1973). 
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Three states have rejected the locality rule 
as the statement of the standard of care a specialist 
h . t' t A . 8 M · h · 9 10 owes is pa ien : rizona; ic igan; and Minnesota. 
Three states have rejected the locality rule 
as the statement of the standard of care for hospitals: 
Iowa; 11 Washington; 12 and Maryland. 13 
Although the Restatement Second of Torts, 
Section 299 A reflects a modified locality rule in that 
it would require a professional to exercise "the skill 
and knowledge normally possessed by members of the pro-
fession or trade in good standing in similar communities", 
"Comment d. Special Representation.", states that if an 
actor holds himself out as a specialist he should be 
held to possess the skill and knowledge of other speci-
alists in that trade. The conunent specifically includes 
physicians and states, "Thus a physician who holds him-
self out as a specialist in certain ty~es of practice is 
required to have the skill and knowledge common to other 
specialists." 
8 Kronkee v Danielson, 108 Ariz. 400, 499 P2d 156 (1972); 
9 10 Christy v Saliterman, 179 NW2d 288 (1970); Naccarato 
v Grob, 348 Mich. 248, 180 NW2d 788 (1970); 11 Dickinson 
v Mailliard, 175 NW2d 588, 36 ALR 3d 425 (1970); 
12 Pederson v Dumochel, Supra; 13 Shilkret v Anapolis 
Hospital Association, Supra . 
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The sole issue remaining is what should ~ 
standard of care once the locality rule has been ab~ 
Plaintiff favors the formulation of the Supreme Court 
of Wisconsin-- "The jury should be told in substan~: 
a qualified medical (or dental) practitioner, be hea 
general practitioner or a specialist, should be subje~ 
to liability in an action for negligence if he fails· 
exercise that degree of care and skill which is exerr 
by the average practitioner in the class to which he: 
longs, acting in the same or similar circumstances. r 
graphical area and its attendent lack of facilities a: 
circumstances that can be considered if appropriate." 
Shier v Freedman, 58 Wis. 2d 269, 266 NW2d 166, 174 (: 
This statement of the standard accurately reflects ili 
realities of medical care in the United States tod~. 
eliminates the injustice that is part and parcel oft 
locality rule yet allows consideration of the defen~ 
inability to keep up with advances in medical care h 
rare case where that may be a factor. 
Accordingly, the only conceivable course~ 
this Court to follow is to overrule the locality ru~ 
in Utah, adopt the standard that most accurately re· 
fleets the realities of medical practice in the UniW 
States today, and remand this case to the trial court 
for a new trial. 
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POINT IV: THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND JURY VERDICT FOR 
DR. MOENCH MUST BE REVERSED AND ON THE RE-
TRIAL OF THIS ACTION, THE LOWER COURT MUST 
BE DIRECTED TO SUBMIT THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS JOINTLY. 
One of the basic principles of the medical 
community in this day and age is the concept of "team 
care". No one medical person provides for all the medi-
cal needs of the patient. Each team or group interacts 
with the other and all share credit for the medical sue-
cess. However, when a failure occurs the team breaks 
apart and each stands separate and points to the other 
or others as being the weak link in the medical care 
chain. 
That has occurred in this case. The attending 
surgeon says the operation was a success and that his 
responsibility for the patient terminated after he turned 
the patient over to the psychiatrist. (Albeit two and 
one-half days after the problem was brought to his at-
tention by the psychiatric social worker.) Dr. Moench, 
on the other hand, says that Farrow was not his patient 
and that he was merely called in for a consultation. 
(He did, however, order immediate medication and a doctor 
can only do that if a doctor/patient relationship exists.) 
The hospital then says that Dr. Moench was not 
precise in his orders and directions, e.g. "how many 
times an hour is direct nurse contact" and "repeated 
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reassurance." 
Dr. Moench then says that he ordered somet 
beyond the routine custodial care that was afforded 
Farrow and testified that such care was available in 
the hospital. Tr. 1271, 1280. The hospital replies 
through Dr. Charles R. Smart who is an employee of t 
hospital and Chief of Surgery. Initially, Dr. Smart 
filed an affidavit in this case in support of the ho: 
pital's motion for summary judgment. Tr. 231. Para: 
6 of the affidavit states: 
"6. In the setting of a hospital giving 
general nursing care, as was the situatim 
in this case, it would be unreasonable fru 
the medical staff to request or expect mon 
frequent contacts than were afforded the 
plaintiff Farrow on the evening of August: 
and early morning of August 24, 1974. It is 
my opinion that the frequency and content 
of the nursing contacts afforded to Chest~ 
E. Farrow on the evening of August 23 and 
early morning of August 24, 1974, were in 
compliance with reasonably prudent nursing 
care on a neurosurgical ward in the Salt 
:r.ake City, Utah, vicinity." 
Dr. Smart was called as a witness for the 
plaintiff during the course of trial for the purpose 
of developing that statement he made in his depositk 
At this point, the hospital was out of the case andb 
tried every way to back away from that statement unti 
finally the court allowed counsel to confront him ~t 
paragraph 6 of his affidavit. Dr. Moench ordered mor 
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than general care; the hospital did not provide it; and 
Dr. Smart testified that it would be unreasonable for 
Dr. Moench to expect it. Tr. 1273, Tr. 1583. Exhibit 
D-1. 
The hospital, through its affidavits, etc., 
says that it reasonably complied with the medication 
orders of Dr. Moench. Dr. Moench, through counsel's 
closing argument replied: Tr. 1994. 
" ... Now, the hospital isn't here to defend 
itself; it isn't sued in this case, but I 
suggest to you when the doctor orders Mel-
laril stat and even if you allow a one-half 
hour leeway, it surely means that it ought 
to be done before 10:00, it ought to be done 
by 8:30 ... Now, if it had been given at 8:30 
and the peak at 12:30 had not produced any 
results, if the fellow was still having the 
same kind of problems as evidenced earlier, 
the nurse would then have had the opportunity 
to give him SO more, if in her judgment he 
needed it ... and if that had been done around 
12:30, quarter to one, that also would have 
begun to take effect, because it begins in 
a half an hour. So by 2:40 there would have 
been the cumulative effect of all that medi-
cine. I suggest to you that if that had been 
done, we would not be here ..• " (Mr. Snow) 
Everyone who has ever defended a tort lawsuit 
knows that the most successful defense is to place blame 
on an absent, third party. That is precisely what has 
happened to the plaintiff at the first trial. 
It is imperative that the summary judgment be 
reversed, the jury verdict be reversed and that the entire 
matter be remanded for new trial so that further injustice 
to the plaintiff will be prevented. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court erroneously granted summar 
judgment in favor of Dr. Schricker and the LOS Hospi 
Dr. Schricker failed in his responsibilities to Farr 
by not timely recognizing that Farrow had become pcy 
tic; taking inunediate steps to protect him; changeh 
environment; and secure the services of a specialist 
His negligence was a question for the jury. 
The extensive fingers of the hospital will 
be cataloged again. It will suffice here to say tha: 
the hospital knew early in the confinement that he~ 
needed and failed to secure that help. Then when~ 
finally arrived, Mr. Farrow was not w~tched as the~ 
chiatrist ordered and not medicated. It does not~ 
an expert to know that negligence is present on thef 
of the hospital and that it must be submitted to a j< 
The jury verdict in favor of Dr. Moench mw 
be reversed. He clearly failed to carry out the duey 
imposed upon a psychiatrist and in particular: 
1. The locality rule must be revised so 
that the opinion of Dr. Walker can be admitted in evi 
2. The instructions to the jury relatingt 
intentional acts is an incorrect statement of the d~ 
imposed upon a psychiatrist and was tantamount to a 
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directed verdict in his favor. (A psychiatrist and 
hospital have a duty to take reasonable measures to 
prevent intentional acts.) 
It must be apparent to the Court that the 
medical community enjoys tremendous advantages in mal-
practice cases. First of all, local doctors will not 
testify against their colleagues and when out of state 
help is brought into the case, they are frequently pre-
vented from testifying by reason of the locality rule. 
It is a statistical fact that with one or two exceptions 
the medical community has never lost a malpractice case 
in the courts of this state. Our courts should stop ac-
cepting the subtle and pervasive propaganda put out by 
the medical rommunity and send this case back with new 
guidelines so that simple and evenhanded justice will be 
restored between litigants in this case and in whole 
field of malpractice. 
4d;.rrett 
Brigham E. Roberts 
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